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ERASING THE LAW: THE IMPLICATIONS OF
SETTLEMENTS CONDITIONED UPON VACATUR OR
REVERSAL OF JUDGMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Settlements conditioned upon vacatur of the initial trial court judgment
and occurring while a case is pending appeal have become more prevalent
in recent years.' The United States courts of appeals have developed three
different standards to apply in deciding whether to grant such motions for
vacatur. 2 Furthermore, the Supreme Court of the United States recently
granted certiorari to a case in which the Court will address partially whether
the federal courts of appeals should vacate district court judgments when
parties enter into postjudgment settlements.3 The controversy over the correct
1. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Seafirst Corp., 891 F.2d 762, 769 (9th Cir.
1989) (holding that insurer was not entitled to vacatur of judgment pursuant to settlement
because of presence of third party interests and potential preclusive effect of judgment); In re
Memorial Hosp., Inc., 862 F.2d 1299, 1300 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that court will deny joint
motions for vacatur after litigants have settled their dispute while appeal is pending); Nestle
Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 284 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that district court
abused its discretion in denying parties' joint motion to vacate trial judgment); Jill E. Fisch,
Rewriting History: The Proprietyof EradicatingPriorDecisionalLaw Through Settlement and
Vacatur, 76 CoaRNEL L. REV. 589, 632-38 (1991) (discussing effects on settlement process of
standard that allows posttrial vacatur of judgments at will of litigants); Henry E. Klingeman,
Note, Settlement Pending Appeal: An Argument for Vacatur, 58 FoDHAM L. REVIEw 233,
235 (1989) (asserting that courts should employ presumption that allows parties to include
vacatur as condition of settlement of cases pending appeal); Stuart N. Rappaport, Note,
CollateralEstoppel Effects of Judgments Vacated Pursuant to Settlement, 1987 U. ILL. L.
REV. 731, 732 (1987) (arguing that courts should not grant preclusive effect to judgments
vacated pursuant to settlement agreement); William D. Zeller, Note, Avoiding Issue Preclusion
by Settlement Conditioned upon the Vacatur of Entered Judgments, 96 YALE L.J. 860, 87478 (1987) (arguing that courts should prohibit vacatur when vacatur is condition of settlement
in cases giving rise to possibility of defensive issue preclusion, but that vacatur should be at
courts' discretion in cases that could form basis for offensive preclusion).
2. See National Union Fire Ins. Co., 891 F.2d at 765-69 (holding district court should
undertake separate determination for each motion for vacatur pursuant to postjudgment
settlement weighing values of finality of judgment and right to relitigation of unreviewed
issues); Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1300 (stating that Ninth Circuit will always deny joint
motions for vacatur after litigants have settled their dispute while appeal is pending); Nestle
Co., 756 F.2d at 283-84 (stating that Second Circuit will routinely grant joint motions for
vacatur); see also infra notes 20-61 and accompanying text (discussing federal circuit cases and
presenting three different standards).
3. 61 U.S.L.W. 3557 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1993); see U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp.,
971 F.2d 728, 731 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that vacatur of trial judgment is appropriate when
postjudgment settlement moots action pending appeal, and rejecting argument that judgment's
issue preclusive use should prevent vacatur), cert. granted sub nom. Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo
Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 113 S. Ct. 1249 (1993); infra notes 62-84 and
accompanying text (discussing Izumi case); infra notes 181-88 and accompanying text (explaining
that Izumi only presents issue of whether courts should grant motions for vacatur of judgments
pursuant to postjudgment settlement when trial judgment has issue preclusive effects).

1229

1230

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1229

standard to apply largely results from tension concerning the proper role
of the judiciary-deciding individual cases or making law.4 In attempting
to deal with this issue, none of the federal courts has recognized all of the
factors that courts should consider when faced with settlements conditioned
upon vacatur of trial judgments.' These considerations include the precedential value of judgments, the issue preclusive effect of judgments, and
the litigants' motives for making vacatur of trial judgments a condition to
settlement.6
Parties seek vacatur of judgments as a condition to settlements for
several reasons: to manipulate precedent in specific substantive areas of the
law, to avoid the issue preclusive effect of a judgment, and to minimize
adverse publicity from a trial. 7 As evidence mounts that parties are using
settlements conditioned upon vacatur to shape precedent, litigants' attempts
to vacate judgments while an appeal is pending become more disturbing.'
One area in which this problem predominates is insurance litigation. Commentators express suspicions that insurance companies use motions for
vacatur to prevent decisions adverse to their interests from influencing the
substantive law that governs the coverage of insurance policies.9 Adding to
these concerns is a recent Supreme Court of California decision that gave
litigants, absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances, ithe right to have
judgments reversed, rather than merely vacated, pursuant to a postjudgment
settlement agreement.' 0
In light of these developments, the legal profession should examine the
full ramifications of granting motions for vacatur or reversal as a condition
to settlement. A resolution of this issue requires a review of the three

4. See infra notes 199-269 and accompanying text (discussing arguments for allowing
vacatur at will of litigants and arguments asserting that cases have value' to public).
5. See discussion infra part II (discussing standards that federal courts of appeals have
applied to motions for vacatur pursuant to postjudgement settlement).
6. See infra notes 286-95 and accompanying text (discussing factors courts should
consider when determining whether to grant motion for vacatur or reversal when granting of
such motion is condition of litigants' settlement).
7. See discussion infra part IV (discussing three primary motivations for making vacatur
or reversal condition to settlement of claim pending appellate review).
8. See infra notes 124-56 and accompanying text (discussing recent evidence of attempts
to manipulate precedent through motions for vacatur of judgments).
9. See Stacy Gordon, Vanishing Precedents: Policyholders Can Get Better Deal-If
Rulings are Erased, Bus. INs., June 15, 1992, at I (discussing growing prevalence of courts'
expunging insurance coverage decisions pursuant to settlements between insurers and policyholders); Roger Parloff, Rigging the Common Law, Am. LAW., Mar. 1992, at 74 (discussing
instances in which institutional insurance litigants have used various procedural mechanisms,
including vacatur, to manipulate development of law concerning legal interpretation of insurance
policies).
10. See Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119, 120 (Cal. 1992) (holding that,
when reversal is condition of settlement agreement, appellate courts should grant joint motions
for reversal of trial court judgments under all but extreme circumstances); infra notes 85-122
and accompanying text (discussing Neary decision).
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standards that the federal courts developed to handle such motions for
vacatur," of the case the Supreme Court of the United States recently
granted certiorari to review,"2 and of the Supreme Court of California's
solution to the problem of settlements conditioned upon the granting of a
motion for reversal.' 3 Also necessary is a discussion of the motivations of
parties seeking to vacate or reverse judgments,' 4 an analysis of the policies
that support granting motions for vacatur at the will of the litigants," and
6
a study of the public effect and public value of judgments.'
This analysis suggests that granting motions to vacate or reverse lower
court decisions as a condition to settlement should remain within the
discretion of the court considering the motion. 17 Courts should decide this
question upon the particular circumstances of each case.' Furthermore, in
making this determination, a court should consider the precedential value
of a judgment, the potential preclusive effect of a judgment, and the
litigants' motives for seeking vacatur or reversal. 19
II.

THE FEDIERAL COURTS

Decisions by the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits present three different methods of handling
postjudgment settlements conditioned upon vacatur. In Nestle Co. v. Chester's Market Inc.,20 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in denying the
parties' joint motion to vacate the district court's earlier judgment when
the parties had conditioned their settlement agreement upon the granting of
such a motion. 21 Nestle had filed a trademark infringement suit against

11. See discussion infra part II (discussing different standards that federal courts of
appeals have applied to motions for vacatur pursuant to postjudgment settlement).
12. See infra notes 62-84 and accompanying text (discussing Izumi case).
13. See discussion infra part III (discussing recent Supreme Court of California decision
giving litigants right to have trial court judgments reversed absent showing of extreme
circumstances).
14. See discussion infra part IV (discussing three primary motivations for making vacatur
or reversal condition of settlement of claim pending appellate review).
15. See discussion infra part V (presenting four major arguments for allowing vacatur
or reversal of judgments at will of litigants when granting of such motions is condition of
settlement).
16. See discussion infra part VI (arguing that judgments can have important impact on
general public and can provide significant public benefits).
17. See discussion infra part VII (describing proper standard to apply to postjudgment
settlements conditioned upon vacatur or reversal of lower court judgments).
18. See infra notes 270-82 and accompanying text (explaining why absolute standards
cannot take into account all relevant considerations when court is determining whether to
grant motion for vacatur or reversal of judgment as condition to settlement).
19. See infra notes 286-95 and accompanying text (describing factors court should examine
when faced with settlement conditioned upon vacatur or reversal of judgment).
20. 756 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1985).
21. Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 284 (2d Cir. 1985).
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Chester's Market and Saccone's Toll House for use of the name "Toll
House. '" 22 The district court granted a partial summary judgment to Saccone,
finding the name generic and not suitable as a trademark. 23 ,Nestle appealed,
but while the appeal was pending, the parties reached a settlement conditioned on vacatur of the district court judgment.2 The Second Circuit
remanded the case to the district court for consideration of the parties'
motion for vacatur.2
On remand, the district court found that vacatur of the prior judgment
was a matter within the court's discretion.2 6 The district court reasoned that
the interest in finality of judgments and the public interest in having courts
adjudicate disputes over trademark validity outweighed the parties' interest

in settlement. 27 The Second Circuit reversed the district court.2 The appellate
court found that the parties' interest in settlement, including not bearing
the costs and risks of further litigation, outweighed the public interest in
finality of judgments and adjudication of trademark disputes. 29

22. Id. at 281.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.Parties attempting to obtain vacatur generally make a motion to the court
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), and courts have commonly construed Rule
60(b) as granting courts the authority to vacate judgments. Id.; see National Union Fire Ins.
Co. v. Seafirst Corp., 891 F.2d 762, 765 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that Rule 60(b) gives appellate
courts wide discretion to vacate judgment when such action is just under circumstances
presented); First Nat'l Bank v. Hirsch, 535 F.2d 343, 344-46 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding that
party attempting to move pursuant to Rule 60(b) to vacate judgment of district court after
notice of appeal should first file motion in district court and not with appellate court). Rule
60(b) provides:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a
party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time
to move for a new trial under 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or otter misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged,
or prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated,
or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application;
or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The Supreme Court has interpreted Rule 60(b)(6) as vesting power in
the courts adequate to enable them to vacate judgments whenever appropriate to accomplish
justice. Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 614 (1949). Parties also have attempted to
use Rule 59(e) to achieve vacatur. See Wisconsin Truck Ctr., Inc. v. Volvo White Truck
Corp., 692 F. Supp. 1010, 1011 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (denying motion for vacatur pursuant to
Rule 59(e) on substantive law grounds).
26. Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1985).
27. Id.
28. Id.at 284.
29. Id.at 282-84. The Federal Circuit also has adopted the Nestle rationale. See Federal
Data Corp. v. SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc., 819 F.2d .277, 280 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding
that when parties to case pending appeal enter into settlement agreement, appellate court
should dismiss action and vacate lower court judgment).
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The Second Circuit reasoned that the intent behind policies favoring
finality of judgments is to conserve judicial resources and that the district
court's reliance on this finality principle to deny the motion for vacatur
was nonsensical because such action would lead to more rather than less
litigation. 30 Furthermore, the Second Circuit emphasized that denial of the
motion in order to protect other unknown users of the trademark "Toll
House" would cause the parties unfairly to bear the costs of further litigation
when they wished to end their dispute.3' The Second Circuit's ruling appears
to require vacatur of district court judgments whenever granting a motion
for vacatur is a condition to settlement, which essentially causes courts to
32
vacate judgments at the will of the litigants.
By contrast, in In re Memorial Hospital, Inc., 31 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit declared that it will always deny joint
motions to vacate a judgment or opinion of the district court pursuant to
a postjudgment settlement, reasoning that a judicial opinion is a public act
of government that parties cannot erase through a private agreement.3 4 The
underlying dispute involved a suit by Memorial Hospital asserting that the
reduction of Medicare payments by the federal government's fiscal intermediary violated the "automatic stay" under federal bankruptcy law.3"
Memorial Hospital recently had filed a bankruptcy petition. 36 The bankruptcy court held the intermediary in contempt of court and ordered the
37
intermediary to restore the funds it had withheld from Memorial Hospital.
3
8
The district court affirmed this decision. The intermediary and the De39
partment of Human Services appealed to the Seventh Circuit.

30. Nestle, 756 F.2d at 282.
31. Id. at 284.
32. See Fisch, supra note 1, at 610 (asserting that strict reading of Nestle suggests that
Second Circuit believes courts should grant litigants' motions for vacatur as matter of right
when litigants settle case conditional upon vacatur of earlier judgment); Klingeman, supra note
1, at 241 n.55 (stating Second Circuit in Nestle implicitly held that vacatur is available to
parties as matter of right); see also Long Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, 888 F.2d 230, 234
(2d. Cir. 1989) (stating that Nestle presents principle that exception to practice of vacating
lower court judgment because of deliberate action of losing party does not apply to situations
in which both parties agree to settlement and vacatur of judgment).
33. 862 F.2d 1299 (7th Cir. 1988).
34. In re Memorial Hosp., Inc., 862 F.2d 1299, 1300 (7th Cir. 1988). Both the District
of Columbia Circuit and the Third Circuit recently have adopted this rationale. See In re
United States, 927 F.2d 626, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (stating that court will deny motions for
vacatur pursuant to postjudgment settlement); Clarendon Ltd. v. Nu-West Indus., Inc., 936
F.2d 127, 129 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that courts should deny motions for vacatur pursuant to
postjudgment settlement).
35. Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1301; see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3),(6) (1988) (stating that
debtor's filing of bankruptcy petition operates as stay against creditors acting to obtain
possession of debtor's property or acting to collect claims arising against debtor before filing
of bankruptcy petition).
36. Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1301.
37. Id.
38. In re Memorial Hosp., Inc., 82 B.R. 478, 479 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1988).
39. In re Memorial Hosp., Inc., 862 F.2d 1299, 1301 (7th Cir. 1988).
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However, before the appellate court could render a decision, the parties
entered into a settlement agreement that called for both parties to join in
a motion to vacate the district court opinion. 40 In denying the joint motion,
the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the precedent created through the resolution of a dispute has social value produced at a cost to the public and is
not the parties' private property.4 1 The appellate court also stated that
granting such motions squanders time the courts already have invested.4 2
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit explained that litigants possess a general
interest in having an orderly judicial system that records iand preserves
judges' solutions to legal disputes for later use. 43 Therefore,, slightly higher
costs in present suits reduce the costs and trouble that judges and litigants
encounter in future cases. 44
Alternatively, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
has developed a method of reviewing joint mcions for vacatur of lower
court opinions pursuant to settlement that strikes a balance between the
contrasting standards of the Second and Seventh Circuits. In National Union
Fire Insurance Co. v. Seafirst Corp.,45 the Ninth Circuit Iheld that the
equities in each particular situation should determine whether a court should
grant the parties' motion for vacatur 6 National Union had issued liability
insurance to Seafirst, but later, after Seafirst filed a claim, brought suit
seeking to have the contract rescinded. 47 National Union asserted that
Seafirst originally procured the insurance policy through fraud. 4 National
Union also brought separate actions against Seafirst's insurance broker,
50
attorney, and accountant. 49 Seafirst counterclaimed for breach of contract.
5
The district court bifurcated the case for trial. ' The first phase would
determine the validity of National Union's fraud claims, and if the jury
found no fraud, the second phase would deal with Seafirst's noncoverage
claim. 2 After the trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict that Seafirst
had not obtained the insurance policy through fraud, National Union and
Seafirst entered into a settlement agreement. 3 The agreement provided that
both parties forego litigating the second phase of the trial and that Seafirst
join National Union in a motion to vacate the trial court judgement. 54

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id. at 1302.
Id.
Id. at 1303.
Id.
891 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1989).
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Seafirst Corp., 891 F.2d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 763.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 764.
Id.

19931

ERASING THE LAW

1235

Additionally, Seafirst expressly agreed that National Union could continue
to pursue Seafirst's insurance broker, attorney, and accountant for damages
for their involvement in the procurement of the insurance policy. 5
The district court denied the motion for vacatur, and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed.5 6 The appeals court held that the lower court should determine
whether to grant such motions by weighing the competing values of finality
57
of judgments and the litigants' right to relitigation of unreviewed issues.
The Ninth Circuit relied on an earlier decision in which it had stated that
making vacatur automatic upon the parties entering into a postjudgment
settlement would damage the principle of judicial finality and would undermine the parties' incentives to settle disputes before trial by decreasing
the risks of taking a controversy to trial.58 The appellate court also criticized
the Seventh Circuit's rule of always denying motions for vacatur as too
inflexible and as making the costs of postjudgment settlement too high.5 9
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit stated that the district court should examine
the equities and hardships in each particular case to determine whether the
court should grant the parties' motion. 60 Applying this rule to the facts of
National Union, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the trial court correctly
denied the motion for vacatur because of the presence of third party interests
and the possibility that the judgment would have a preclusive effect on
later litigation. 61
The Supreme Court of the United States may resolve partially this split
between the federal circuits in Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v.
U.S. Philips Corp.. 62 The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to
decide Izumi,63 which presents the question of whether the United States
courts of appeals should vacate final judgments having issue preclusive
effects at parties' request when the litigants settle cases pending appeal.64
In Izumi the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit granted the parties'
joint motion for vacatur of the trial judgment after the parties had entered

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 765 (quoting Ringsby Truck Lines v. Western Conference of Teamsters, 686
F.2d 720, 722 (9th Cir. 1982)).
58. Id. at 767 (quoting Ringsby, 686 F.2d at 721).
59. Id. at 769.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 971 F.2d 728 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. granted 113 S. Ct. 1249 (1993).
63. Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 113 S. Ct. 1249

(1993).
64. See 61 U.S.L.W. 3557 (Feb. 23, 1993) (stating that Izumi presents Supreme Court
with issue of whether federal courts of appeals should routinely vacate district court judgments
at parties' request upon postjudgment settlement); see also U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere
Corp., 971 F.2d 728, 731 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that vacatur of trial judgment is appropriate
when postjudgment settlement moots action pending appeal, and rejecting argument that
judgment's issue preclusive use should prevent vacatur), cert. grantedsub nom. Izumi Seimitsu
Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 113 S. Ct. 1249 (1993).
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into a postjudgment settlement. 6 The Federal Circuit stated that the parties
were entitled to rely on its prior precedent,66 which endorsed the Second
Circuit's practice of routinely granting parties' motions for vacatur upon
settlement of cases pending appeal.67

In Izumi U.S. Philips Corporation, North American Philips Corporation, and N.V. Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken (Philips) brought patent infringement and unfair competition claims against Windmere Corporation
(Windmere) and Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha (Izumi) in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.6s Only
Philips and Izumi manufacture rotary electric razors for sale in the United
States. 69 N.V. Philips sells razors through its subsidiary North American
Philips while Izumi sells razors to Windmere and Sears Roebuck & Company
(Sears) for resale in the United States. 70 Philips argued that Windmere's
Ronson rotary razors violated Philips' patents on Norelco rotaries and that
Windmere created confusion among consumers by marketing its Ronson
razor as if it were nearly identical to the Norelco razor.7 t Windmere filed
counterclaims asserting that Philips had attempted to monopolize the electric

72
rotary shaver market in violation of the Sherman Act.
After a jury trial, a remand, and another trial, the Florida district court

entered judgments for Philips pursuant to the patent claims and for Wind-

mere under the unfair competition count and antitrust counterclaim. 73 Izumi
was a party to the patent infringement judgment, but did not file an

65. U.S. Philips, 971 F.2d at 731.
66. Id.
67. See Federal Data Corp. v. SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc., 819 F.2d 277, 280 (Fed.
Cir. 1987) (holding that when parties to case pending appeal enter into settlement agreement,
appellate court should dismiss action and vacate lower court judgment).
68. U.S. Philips, 971 F.2d at 729.
69. U.S. Philips Corp. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. 85-C5366, 1987 WL 26123, at *1
(N.D. I11.Dec. 2, 1987).
70. Id. Philips sells its razors in the United States under the trade name "Norelco." Id.
Windmere sells Izumi's razors under the "Ronson" trade name, and Sears sells the razors
under its own name. Id.
71. U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., No. 84-2508CIV, 1991 WL 338258, at *1
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 3, 1991).
72. U.S. Philips, 1991 WL 338258, at *1.
73. U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 971 F.2d 728, 729 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert.
granted sub nom. Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 113 S. Ct.
1249 (1993). Windmere did not appeal the judgment on the patent infringement claim after
the initial trial, and the district court entered final judgment on that count in 1986. Id.
However, the Federal Circuit found that the district court had improperly directed a verdict
against Windmere on the antitrust counterclaim in the first trial and remanded the case to the
district court. Id. In the second trial, a jury found in favor of Windmere on both the unfair
competition claim and antitrust counterclaims. Id. The court awarded Windmere $86,644,257
in trebled damages on its antitrust counterclaim. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, U.S.
Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 971 F.2d 728 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. granted sub nom.
Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 113 S. Ct. 1249 (1993) (No.
92-1123).
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appearance in the trial of the other issues.7 4 Philips appealed the unfair
competition and antitrust judgments to the Federal Circuit. 5 While this
appeal was pending, Philips and Windmere entered into a settlement agreement that called for both parties to join in a motion for vacatur of the
trial judgment.7 6 Izumi opposed the parties' motion for vacatur asserting
that the Federal Circuit should preserve the trial judgment because an
77
Illinois district court had used the judgment for issue preclusion purposes.
Months after Philips had filed its action against Windmere and Izumi in
the Southern District'of Florida, Philips instituted a similar suit against
Sears and Izumi in the Northern District of Illinois.7 8 The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that the judgment
against Philips on its unfair competition claim in the Florida 7court
precluded
9
Philips from contesting the same issue in the Illinois court.
The Federal Circuit rejected Izumi's argument that the court should not
vacate the Florida judgment because of its issue preclusive effects, holding
that Izumi did not have standing to oppose the parties' motion for vacatur.80
The Federal Circuit stated that Izumi's substantial involvement and substantial interest in the suit did not provide standing to oppose the motion
for vacatur.8s The Federal Circuit then addressed the appropriateness of the
parties' motion for vacatur and granted the joint nmotion.1 2 The appellate
court stated that a postjudgment settlement moots an action on appeal,
making vacatur proper. 3 Although the Federal Circuit noted that some

74. U.S. Philips, 971 F.2d at 730.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 730. Petitioner, Izumi, noted that settlement had not been expressly conditioned
upon vacatur. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5.
77. U.S. Philips, 971 F.2d at 730.
78. See U.S. Philips Corp. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. 85-C5366, 1987 WL 26123, at
*1 (N.D. III. Dec. 2, 1987) (stating that on June 6, 1985 Philips filed action against Sears and
Izumi alleging that Sears infringed and Izumi induced infringement of patents relating to
Philips's "Norelco" rotary razor).
79. U.S. Philips v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. 85-C5366, 1992 WL 296361, at *1 (Oct.
14, 1992).
80. U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 971 F.2d 728, 731 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert.
granted sub nom. Izufii Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 113 S. Ct.
1249 (1993). The Federal Circuit found that Izumi was not a party to the appeal or to the
trial of the unfair competition and antitrust claims. Id. at 730.
81. See id. (rejecting Izumi's argument that even as nonparty it has sufficient interest to
oppose vacatur, and stating that financial or commercial interest in unfair competition claim
does not confer standing).
82. Id. at 731.
83. Id. Noting that vacatur is the general rule in the Federal Circuit, the court stated
that it was not holding that a court must always grant vacatur. Id. However, in rejecting
Izumi's collateral estoppel argument in this case, where a court clearly had used the judgment
in question to preclude a party from asserting the same issue in subsequent litigation, the
Federal Circuit has demonstrated that few if any grounds will prevent the court from vacating
a judgment following postjudgment settlement. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5 n.4,
U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 971 F.2d 728 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. granted sub noma.
Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 113 S. Ct. 1249 (1993) (No.
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circuits have declined to vacate judgments merely because the parties have
settled their dispute, the court stated that Philips and Windmere were
entitled to rely on prior Federal Circuit precedent that called for vacatur
under the circumstances presented.Y
III.

NEARY V. REGENTS OF Ti

UNIvERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

A recent Supreme Court of California decision has added to the debate
over settlements conditioned upon the vacatur of lower court judgments.
However, the Supreme Court of California went a step further than any of
the federal courts of appeals by granting the litigants' motion to have the
trial judgment reversed rather than vacated. In Neary v. Regents of Uni85 the Supreme Court of California held that the
versity of California
California Court of Appeals must grant the requests of parties to reverse a
trial court judgment, absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances, if6
obtaining such an order is a condition to the parties' settlement agreement.
The plaintiff, George Neary, had obtained a $7,000,000 verdict at trial in
a libel action against defendants, the Regents of the University of California
and three veterinarians that the University employed.8 7 Thd University had
published the veterinarians' report stating that Neary caused the death" of
several of his cattle through incompetent management of his ranch." Neary
maintained that the allegations in the report were false and that pesticides
sprayed by the government had poisoned his cattle.8 9 The defendants appealed the trial court judgment in favor of Neary, and Neary crossappealed.90
I
Nevertheless, the parties entered into a settlement agreement while the
appeal was pending. 9' The agreement required that the defendants pay Neary
$3,000,000 and for Neary to join the defendants in a motion to reverse the
trial court judgment and dismiss the appeal. 92 Upon making this motion,
the parties advised the court of appeals that the stipulated reversal was a
condition precedent to their settlement. 9 The court of appeals held that the
reversal of a judicial opinion is not proper simply because the parties have
made such action a condition to their agreement. 94 On appeal, the Supreme

92-1123) (stating that in view of Federal Circuit's refusal to entertain Izumi's opposition to
vacatur, scenario where court would not automatically grant vacatur is difficult to imagine).
84. U.S. Philips Corp., 971 F.2d at 731.
85. 834 P.2d 119 (Cal. 1992).
86. Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119, 120 (Cal. 1992).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 278 Cal. Rptr. 773, 774 (Ct. App. 1991).
94. Id. at 775.
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Court of California reversed the court of appeals' order denying the motion
for stipulated reversal. 95
The supreme court's holding governs motions for reversal of trial court
judgments rather than vacatur of such judgments. 96 Unlike a vacatur, a
reversal is an affirmative finding of fact and law? 7 Reversal means overturning a judgment by contrary decision or annulling it because of error.9 8
Therefore, granting a motion for reversal connotes more than simply the
setting aside of a lower court judgment by an appellate court. Rather,
reversal indicates that the appellate court is overturning the judgment
because something is specifically wrong in the lower court's legal reasoning
or finding of facts. 9
To justify its ruling that parties are entitled to reversal absent a showing
of extraordinary circumstances, the Supreme Court of California used a
somewhat different analysis than the Second Circuit employed in Nestle.
The supreme court first stated that granting motions for reversal to facilitate
postjudgment settlements promotes efficiency because a reversal saves both
the court of appeals and the parties to the suit from the considerable expense
of litigating the case on appeal.'0 ° Secondly, the supreme court implicitly

95. Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119, 126 (Cal. 1992).
96. Id. at 120.
97. Gail D. Cox, Innovation-Or Just Court Triage?, 15 NAT'L L.J., Oct. 5, 1992, at
1, 11 (quoting Fordham University School of Law Professor Jill E. Fisch).
98. BLACK's LAW DIcTioNARY 1319 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v.
St. Joe Paper Co., 216 F.2d 832, 833 (5th Cir. 1954)).
99. See Department oT Water & Power v. Inyo Chem. Co., 100 P.2d 822, 826 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App.) (stating that to reverse means to change to contrary), rev'd, 108 P.2d 410
(Cal. 1940).
100. Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119, 121-22 (Cal. 1992). Commentators
have perceived the Neary opinion as a reaction to the Supreme Court of California's excessive
caseload and as further indication of the supreme court's preoccupation with clearing dockets
as quickly as possible. See Cox, supra note 97, at 10-11 (discussing Supreme Court of
California's increasing willingness to use unorthodox judicial techniques to remove cases from
its docket).
The Supreme Court of California's utilization of a process termed decertification or
depublication also evidences the supreme court's concern with its crowded docket. Through
depublication, the Supreme Court of California can order the Reporter of Decisions not to
publish specified court of appeals' decisions in the official reporters. See CALnr. RULES OF
COURT 976(c)(2) (stating supreme court has power to depublish cases that appellate courts have
decided meet requirements for publication); see also CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 14 (stating that
legislature will provide for publication of decisions of supreme court and court of appeals).
When the Supreme Court of California depublishes or decertifies opinions, they are still
dispositive as to the matter in dispute, but the supreme court prohibits attorneys from citing
to them in other legal proceedings. See Julie Hayward Biggs, Note, Decertificationof Appellate
Opinions: The Need for Articulated Judicial Reasoning and Certain Precedent in California
Law, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 1181, 1186 (1977) (explaining process of decertification and
implications of decertification). However, decertified opinions sometimes appear in reporters
other than California's Official Reporter or on Lexis and Westlaw. One such decision is
American Star Ins. Co. v. American Employer's Ins. Co., 210 Cal. Rptr. 836 (Ct. App. 1985).
The published decision contains a note stating that the Supreme Court of California denied
review and decertified the opinion on May 16, 1985, but the opinion is still available in West's
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rejected the court of appeals' assertion that the role of the judiciary is to
define the law and apply it in particular circumstances rather than to satisfy
the parties appearing before it."'0 The supreme court stressed that the purpose
of the judicial system is to resolve disputes between real people.'2° The
court further stated that the "real value" of a judicial pronouncement and
the paramount purpose of litigation is settling the dispute between the
specific parties before the court."' 3 If a court achieves that goal, even after4
judgment, a court has fulfilled the judicial system's essential function."'
The supreme court further asserted that the court of !appeals wrongly
suggested that a trial court decision had value as guidance to other courts."' 5
The court supported this conclusion by explaining that trial courts do not
provide binding precedent."'6
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of California acknowledged the possibility of situations in which the public interest would weigh heavily against
granting stipulated reversal."' 7 However, the court set a very high standard
for evaluating such a public interest, stating that to overcome the strong
presumption in favor of granting reversal the interest must be specific,
demonstrable, well established, and compelling.' 8 By contrast, the court
expressed that in most cases the public interest against reversal would be
indirect and amorphous."' 9
In an adamant dissent, Justice Kennard argued that in settling specific
disputes the judiciary interprets and enforces policies adopted by the legislative process."" Therefore, the ultimate purpose of a judgment is to
administer the laws of the state of California and do justice."' Because a
judgment embodies an official act of government, courts must reconcile a
judgment's reversal with public interests in addition to the litigants' interests." 2 Justice Kennard asserted that before granting motions for stipulated
I

California Reporter, on Lexis, and on Westlaw. The practice of depublication has spurred
considerable debate. See generally Julie Hayward Biggs, Censoring the Law in California:
DecertificationRevisited, 30 HAsmNGs L.J. 1577 (1979) (discussing problems in Supreme Court
of California's application of depublication process and summarizing several decertified cases);
Robert S. Gerstein, "Law by Elimination:" Depublication inthe California Supreme Court,
67 JUDICATURE 293 (1984) (discussing history of depublication, arguments against depublication,
and ultimate impact of depublication); Joseph R. Grodin, The Depublication Practiceof the
CaliforniaSupreme Court, 72 CAL. L. REv. 514 (1984) (defending Supreme Court of California's use of depublication).
101. Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 278 Cal. Rptr. 773, 777 (Ct. App. 1991).
102. Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119, 124 (Cal. 1992).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.at 125.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.at 127 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
111. Id.(Kennard, J., dissenting).
112. Id.(Kennard, J., dissenting).
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reversal, appellate courts should examine the parties' reasons for seeking
stipulated reversal and should determine whether the judgment has value
for third parties or the public at large. 13 Unlike the majority, Justice
Kennard felt the14 appropriate presumption should be against allowing stipulated reversal.
Justice Kennard reasoned that public respect for the courts erodes when
parties who lose at the trial level can, in effect, purchase the nullification
of the adverse judgment at the appellate level." 5 Such action reinforces the
notion that the quality of justice a litigant can expect is proportional to the
financial means that the litigant possesses." 6 Justice Kennard also argued
that if litigants can delete an adverse decision easily by making stipulated
reversal a condition to postjudgment settlement, parties concerned about
the collateral consequences of an adverse judgment will have less incentive
to settle cases before trial.17 Litigants may gamble on favorable judgments
and if unsuccessful at trial, settle cases after judgment and move for
reversal."' These litigants are no worse off than if they had avoided trial
and final judgment by pretrial settlement." 9
Furthermore, Justice Kennard's dissent recognized that some judgments
have value for society at large, even though they have no particular value
for an identifiable nonparty 20 The justice pointed specifically to cases
2
involving public officials and the propriety of their official actions.' ' In
light of these considerations, Justice Kennard would have held that appellate
courts should deny the request of parties to reverse a trial court judgment
to facilitate settlement if a reasonable probability exists that such reversal
will affect the interests of nonparties or the public adversely. 122
IV.

INCENTIVES FOR UTILIZING SETTLEMENTS CONDITIONED UPON VACATUR

Parties may seek vacatur or reversal of a trial court judgment as a
condition to a settlement for any of three major reasons: manipulating
precedent in specific substantive areas of the law, avoiding the collateral
estoppel effects of an opinion, or minimizing" adverse publicity from a
trial.1

113. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
114. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
115. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 127-28 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 129 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 129-30 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 130 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
120. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
121. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 132 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
123. See infra notes 124-98 and accompanying text (discussing motivations for parties to
enter into settlements conditioned upon vacatur or reversal of lower court judgments).
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A.

Preventing the Establishment of Adverse Precedent

The most disturbing motive that litigants may have for making the

vacatur or reversal of a judgment a condition to settlement is preventing
the affirmance of decisions that could create precedent adverse to the
litigants' interests.Iu Institutional litigants have the greatest incentive to

apply vacatur in this manner, for they repeatedly appear' in court to try
matters controlled by the same substantive area of law.'

5

A good example

of this phenomenon occurs in the context of insurance litigation. Insurance
companies are involved continually in litigation over their ihability to policyholders. 26 Insurers have considerable incentive to avoid the establishment
of adverse precedent concerning their policy provisions in any state or
federal court because insurance contracts tend to be standardized throughout

the United States.127 This incentive also is great because much of the debate
in insurance litigation concerns which party has the support of the greater
weight of authority." 8 Therefore, litigants in insurance cases have a significant advantage if they can point to a recent decision as an indication that
129
the weight of authority is shifting in their favor.
The precedential value of a case that a court has vacated is minimal. 30
To vacate means to annul, to set aside, to cancel, or to rescind, indicating
that a vacated judgment has no precedential force.' The United States
Supreme Court has stated in dictum that the vacatur of a judgment, of

necessity, deprives a court's opinion of any precedential effect. 3 2 Similarly,
1

124. See infra notes 125-56 and accompanying text (asserting that manipulation of precedent is major motivation behind parties' making vacatur or reversal of judgment condition
of settlement agreement).
125. See infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text (discussing incentives insurance companies possess to prevent formation of precedent adversely construing meaning of policy
provisions).
126. See Parloff, supra note 9, at 74-79 (documenting legal battles between insurers and
policyholders concerning coverage of insurance policies for various damages).
127. See id. at 74 (stating that since at least 1940, most insurers have commonly issued
Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) insurance policies, which follow uniform format).
128. See Gordon, supra note 9, at 14 (stating that both attorneys who work for insurers
and policyholders' attorneys constantly keep tally of number of judicial decisions in their favor
and claim that these calculations indicate that substantive law favors their clients).
129. See id. (stating that institutional insurance litigants constantly assert that newest
court decisions indicate that "weight of authority" is in their favor).
130. See infra notes 131-39 and accompanying text (discussing precedentia value of vacated
judgments).
131. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1548 (6th ed. 1990).

132. County of L.A. v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 634 n.6 (1978) (quoting O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577-78 n.12 (1975)); see A. L. Mechling Barge Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 368 U.S. 324, 329 n.1l (1961) (stating that vacated district court judgment did not
establish precedent demanding adherence); United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36,
40-41 (1950) (stating that courts commonly use vacatur to prevent judgments from having any
legal consequences). But see Davis, 440 U.S. at 646 n.10 (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that
lower court's statements will have precedential weight until court decides contrary authority,
even though vacatur prevents judgment from being "the law of the case").
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the federal courts of appeals have stated that the vacatur of a judgment
prevents the judgment from having stare decisis effect'33 and have implied,
in some instances, that courts should not rely on vacated judgments even
34
as persuasive authority.
Conversely, some circuits have expressed the view that vacating a
judgment does not diminish any of the judgment's precedential effect. 35
Those who support this assertion argue that if the lower court believed a
live controversy existed when the court decided the case, the same circumstances that produced the opinion also produced all other decisions to which
courts give precedential weight. 3 6 Other commentators have stated that a
vacated judgment can act as persuasive authority, although it will not have
37
any formal stare decisis effect.'

Although the persuasive force of a vacated judgment likely will remain
as long as a court's opinion is available to read, a vacatur order clouds
and diminishes the significance of a court's holding. 3 $ Subsequent litigants

often find it difficult to determine if a court vacated a decision for a reason
that goes to the validity of the judgment, such as reconsideration of the

court's earlier legal reasoning. 39 Therefore, vacatur of a judgment may
deter litigants in later cases from citing the judgment even as persuasive
authority.

133. See Martinez v. Winner, 800 F.2d 230, 231 (10th Cir. 1986) (stating that order to
district court to vacate earlier district court judgment will remove stare decisis effect of vacated
judgment); Weisburg v. Webster, 749 F.2d 864, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that courts
cannot consider judgments vacated on mootness grounds as authoritative law of circuit);
Marshall v. Whittaker Corp., 610 F.2d 1141, 1145 (3d. Cir. 1979) (stating that vacating district
court judgment deprives prior district court order of precedential effect).
134. See Tyler v. Black, 865 F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating that portion of prior
appellate judgment that dealt with issue which became moot due to settlement does not have
precedential value); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Brock, 778 F.2d 834, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (stating that
earlier vacated judgment does not constitute judicial precedent, that vacated judgment is
without force or effect, and that vacated judgment cannot have any bearing on later cases
raising similar issues); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. McCoy Restaurants, Inc., 708 F.2d 582, 585
(11th Cir. 1983) (stating that vacated district court ruling has no precedential value); Curtis v.
Taylor, 648 F.2d 946, 947 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that vacatur of district court judgment will
prevent district court opinion from "spawning" any precedential consequences); Kuahulu v.
Employers Ins., 557 F.2d 1334, 1337 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating that vacatur of orders of district
court will erase any precedential effect of orders).
135. See United States v. Articles of Drug Consisting of 203 Paper Bags, 818 F.2d 569,
572 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that only purpose of vacating judgment on grounds of supervening
mootness is to prevent decision from having res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in future
cases and that district court judgment vacated under such circumstances has same precedential
effect as unreviewed lower court decision).
136. 13A CHARLEs A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERA. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3533.10
(1981).
137. See Klingeman, supra note 1, at 246-47 (asserting that vacatur does not wholly
deprive judgment of precedential value).
138. In re Memorial Hosp., Inc., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988).
139. See Fisch, supra note 1, at 630 (stating that court may vacate judgment because of
fraud, mistake, newly discovered evidence, or second thoughts about legitimacy of legal rulings).
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The defendant insurance company in Bankers Trust Co. v. Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co. 14 appears to have desired to prevent the establishment of precedent adverse to the defendant's interests. in Bankers Trust
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held
on summary judgment that defendant insurance company, Hartford Accident and Indemnity, was liable to its policyholder, Bankers Trust Company. 141 The district court held Hartford liable pursuant to a Comprehensive
General Liability (CGL) policy for the cost of environmental cleanup
operations on Bankers Trust's property, to the extent that such operations
prevented damage to the property of third persons. 42 The parties subsequently entered into a settlement agreement providing that the defendant
pay the policyholder $200,000 more than the trial court had awarded, with
43
the understanding that the court would vacate its earlier judgment.
However, the district court's order vacating the earlier judgment did
not mention the parties' settlement as the reason for the order. 1 Rather,
the district court stated that it was vacating its prior judgment so Hartford
could submit supplemental affidavits to enable the court to redetermine
Bankers Trust's motion for summary judgment.1 4 A day later the court
granted an order dismissing the case.'" The court's order vacating the earlier
judgment provides a significant obstacle to attorneys wishing to cite to the
original judgment because opponents can contend that the court had second
47
thoughts about its initial reasoning.
The stakes are great in cases, such as Bankers Trust, which concern
whether insurers are liable for the cost of environmental cleanup under
CGL insurance policies.'" However, most of these cases deal with the

140. 518 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated, 621 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y 1981).
141. Bankers Trust Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 518 F. Supp. 371, 372-73
(S.D.N.Y.), vacated, 621 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
142. Id. The environmental damage resulted from a leak in an oil tank located on Bankers
Trust's property that polluted an adjacent river and the corresponding shoreline. Id. The
insurance policy that Hartford had issued to Bankers Trust covered liability for damage to
the property of third persons, but excluded liability for damage to the policyholder's property.
Id. at 372. Hartford contended that Bankers Trust removed oil from the soil of its property
to remedy damage to plaintiff's property and not to the property of third parties. Id. at 373.
The district court reasoned that common sense called for the court to read the insurance policy
to cover cleanup operations on the insured's property commenced to prevent damage to a
third person's property. Id. at 374. A contrary construction only would motivate policyholders
to allow pollution to continue, causing further damage to third parties-damage for which the
insurer would bear ultimate liability. Id.
143. See Parloff, supra note 9, at 78 (describing details of settlement agreement between
Hartford and Bankers Trust).
144. Bankers Trust, 621 F. Supp at 685.
145. Id.
146. Parloff, supra note 9, at 78.
147. See id. (stating that district court's vacatur order allows attorneys representing
insurance companies to contend that district court had second thoughts about reasoning in
initial Bankers Trust judgment).
148. See notes 149-56 and accompanying text (discussing significant ramifications of legal
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question of who is liable for hazardous waste cleanup imposed pursuant to
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA)-more commonly known as the Superfund legislation. 49 As companies increasingly face liability under CERCLA, they are
attempting to recover the costs of cleanup from their insurers pursuant to
CGL insurance policies.15 0 Consequently, insurers and policyholders have
engaged in extensive litigation over who is ultimately liable for such costs
under these policies. 151

Immense amounts of money are at stake in this legal battle because
CGL policies exist widely throughout the United States.

52

The potential

costs of cleaning up hazardous waste sites subject to CERCLA are enormous. 53 Enviromnental experts have estimated the average cost of cleanup
for a site as $8.1 million. 54 Commentators have projected the total cost of
cleaning up all potential hazardous waste disposal sites as being $100
billion.' Therefore, the incentive for actors engaged in CERCLA and
to manipulate precedent by vacatur of judgrelated CGL policy litigation
56
ments is especially great.

battles over interpretation of coverage of insurance policies because of potential cleanup costs
pursuant to Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA)). Hartford's agreement to pay Bankers Trust over $2 million to settle their dispute
exemplifies the enormous stakes present in cases concerning insurer liability for environmental
cleanup under CGL policies. See Parloff, supra note 9, at 78 (discussing terms of Bankers
Trust settlement agreement).
149. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). Courts have interpreted CERCLA
as imposing retroactive, joint and several, strict liability on all potentially responsible parties
for cleanup of hazardous waste cites. See Stephen Mountainspring, Comment, Insurance
Coverage of CERCLA Response Costs: The Limits of "Damages" in Comprehensive General
Liability Policies, 16 ECOLo GY L.Q. 755, 757 (1989) (citing several federal district court opinions
that support principle that potentially responsible parties are retroactively, jointly and severally,
and strictly liable under CERCLA). CERCLA includes as potentially responsible parties for
uncontrolled hazardous waste sites: anyone owning property or operating a facility where
hazardous substances are located, anyone arranging for disposal or treatment of hazardous
substances at the facility, and anyone generating hazardous waste. Nancy W. Moots, Insurance
Coveragefor Superfund Claims: Are Response Costs Recoverable Damages?, 41 S.C. L. Rv.
871, 872 (1990) (citing CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988)).
150. Mountainspring, supra note 149, at 755.
151. Id. at 759. Insurers and policyholders generally have argued over the meaning of the
term "damages" in CGL policies. Id. at 755, 759.152. See id. at 758 (explaining that business insurers have issued CGL insurance policies
since 1880).
153. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text (discussing potential costs of cleanup
pursuant to CERCLA).
154. See Mountainspring, supra note 149, at 757-58 (illuminating cost estimates of Environmental Protection Agency).
155. See id. at 757 (discussing projections of Office of Technology Assessment).
156. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text (discussing large amount of money
at stake in legal battle between insurers and policyholders over who is ultimately liable for
hazardous waste cleanup pursuant to CERCLA).
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B.

Issue Preclusion

Another motive that parties may possess for making vacatur or reversal
of a judgment a condition to settlement is avoiding issue preclusion. A final
judgment can have several binding effects on the parties to a lawsuit, one
of which is issue preclusion-also termed collateral estoppel.' 57 Under the
doctrine of issue preclusion, a final judgment in an earlier action precludes
a party from relitigating matters or issues controverted in the first action. 5
A person claiming the benefit of issue preclusion must prove that the earlier
lawsuit involved the actual litigation of the fact or point now in issue and
that the court's judgment necessarily determined that fact or point. 5 9
Furthermore, if the party asserting issue preclusion was not a party to the
earlier suit, the court must determine whether the party against whom
preclusion is being sought had a fair opportunity to litigate the matter in
the prior litigation.160
Traditionally, a party could not use issue preclusion or have issue
preclusion used against it if the party was not a litigant in the original suit,
or in privity with an actor in the prior action. 161 However, courts increasingly
have relieved parties attempting to assert issue preclusion from this mutuality
requirement. 62 Modern courts have allowed people to use issue preclusion
both offensively 63 and defensively'" even if the people were not parties to

157. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PI OCEDuRE 532 (2d ed.
1978) (identifying issue preclusion and claim preclusion as two binding effects of judgment);
1B JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PiACICE § 0.441 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing
general principles of issue preclusion); 18 WEIGHT ET AL., supra note 136, § 4402 (discussing
general principles of res judicata and distinguishing between issue preclusion and claim
preclusion). The other significant effect of a final judgment is claim preclusion. JAMES &
HAZARD, supra, at 532. Claim preclusion also is referred to as merger and bar. Id. Claim
preclusion involves a judgment's acting as an absolute bar to any subsequent action by the
parties involved in the initial litigation and anyone in privity with them. Id. (quoting Cromwell
v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1877)). In other words, when a court asserts claim
preclusion, a judgment is final as to the claim that was the subject of the original litigation.
Id. (quoting Cromwell, 94 U.S. at 352-53). This finality applies not only to every matter that
the parties offered and the court received in argument over the claim, but also to every matter
that the parties could have offered either to support or refute the original claim. Id. at 53233 (quoting Cromwell, 94 U.S. at 352-53).
158. See JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 157, at 533 (quoting Cromwell v. County of Sac,
94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1877)) (stating that where second action between parties is upon different
claim or demand, judgment in prior action operates as estoppel only to matters in issue and
upon determination of which jury rendered verdict).
159. See id. at 563-64 (listing traditional requirements for application of issue preclusion).
160. See id. at 579-80 (discussing courts' increasing proclivity to allow parties to assert
nonmutual collateral estoppel as long as party to earlier action had opportunity to fully litigate
issue); see also Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328
(1971) (providing requirements for use of nonmutual defensive coliaterallestoppel).
161. See JAMSs & HAZARD, supra note 157, at 578 (explaining courts' traditional application
of mutuality requirement).
162. See infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text (discussing diminishment in court
enforcement of requirement of mutuality against parties attempting to utilize issue preclusion).
163. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332-33 (1979) (holding that if
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the original suit. Because courts now often ignore the mutuality requirement,

parties engaged in litigation must consider not only the costs of losing the
present suit, but also the possibility that losing the current case will decrease
severely their chances to prevail in future cases dealing with the same

circumstances.

1 5

Additionally, the original parties to a suit cannot eliminate the preclusive

effects of judgments by simply settling their disputes while their cases are
pending appeal. Courts have applied issue preclusion to issues determined
by prior trial court judgments even though the parties to the earlier suit
resolved their litigation through postjudgment settlement. 166 The courts have

required only that the trial court rendered the prior judgment after the
parties had a fair and full opportunity to litigate and that the judgment
was consistent with the parties' settlement.1 67 In contrast, courts generally

have held that vacated judgments have no preclusive effect. 68 Therefore, a
desire to avoid the issue preclusive effects of judgments is a possible motive
of parties moving courts for vacatur as a condition to postjudgment settlement.

69

party received "full and fair" opportunity to litigate issue in prior action and opposing party
could not have joined earlier action, court's application of issue preclusion is proper).
164. See Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 322-30 (discussing historic development of courts'
reluctance to enforce mutuality requirement of collateral estoppel); Bernhard v. Bank of Am.,
122 P.2d 892, 895 (Cal. 1942) (holding that court would not preclude party from asserting
collateral estoppel despite party's lack of privity or mutuality of estoppel).
165. See Fisch, supra note 1, at 635-36 (discussing how possible preclusive costs of
judgment increase parties' incentives to settle disputes before trial).
166. See Hartley v. Mentor Corp., 869 F.2d 1469, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (stating that
when court makes rulings after litigant has had full and fair opportunity litigate and rulings
are consistent with parties' subsequent settlement agreement, courts have applied issue preclusion to issues raised in succeeding suits) (citing Employees Own Fed. Credit Union v. City of
Defiance, 752 F.2d 243, 245 (6th Cir. 1985); Swift Chem. Co. v. Usamex Fertilizers, Inc., 646
F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1438, 1442
(M.D. Fla. 1988); Donovan v. United States Postal Serv., 530 F. Supp. 894 (D.D.C. 1981)).
167. Hartley, 869 F.2d at 1472.
168. See Dodrill v. Ludt, 764 F.2d 442, 444 (6th Cir. 1985) (stating that general rule is
that vacated judgment has no conclusive effect as collateral estoppel); Quarles v. Sager, 687
F.2d 344, 346 (l1th Cir. 1982) (holding that judgment vacated because of mootness has no
"res judicata" effect); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 578 F. Supp. 911, 919
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating that judgment vacated by court of appeals lacks cbllateral estoppel
effect); see also MooP., supra note 157, § 0.416(2) (stating that court's vacating, reversing,
or setting aside of judgment deprives judgment of all conclusive effect as res judicata and
collateral estoppel); Robert Barker, CollateralEstoppel; Workers' Compensation, N.Y.L.J.,
Apr. 23, 1990, at 3 (providing general discussion about whether vacated judgments should
subsequently have preclusive effect). But see Bates v. Union Oil Co., 944 F.2d 647, 650 (9th
Cir. 1991) (holding that judgment vacated pursuant to litigants' settlement agreement can still
have preclusive effect if court did not balance values of finality of judgments with litigants'
rights to relitigation when making vacatur determination); Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds,
Inc., 682 F.2d 1149, 1192 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that subsequently vacated judgment has
preclusive effect), vacated, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983). The Fifth Circuit stated in a later opinion
that Chemetron has no precedential force. Hughes v. Santa Fe Int'l Corp., 847 F.2d 239, 242
(5th Cir. 1988).
169. See infra notes 181-92 and accompanying text (asserting that litigants in Izumi and
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Hartley v. Mentor Corp.70° exemplifies the result some parties seek to
prevent by making vacatur a condition to settlement of a suit. Before
Hartley was litigated, a court had ruled on summary judgment in a patent
infringement dispute between Hartley and Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company (3M) that Hartley's patent was invalid.' 7' The parties later
negotiated a settlement that provided for an entry of stipulated judgment
dismissing Hartley's infringement claim against 3M. 72 Subsequently, Hartley
brought an action against a third party, Mentor Corporation, for failing to
pay royalties to Hartley pursuant to the patent that the court had found
invalid in the earlier action. 7 1 Mentor had purchased certain assets of
American Hospital Supply Corporation, including American Hospital Supply's rights to the patent under a licensing agreement with Hartley. 74 Mentor
refused to pay royalties pursuant to this agreement because of the court's
decision in Hartley's earlier suit against 3M.171
Mentor asserted issue preclusion against Hartley, arguing that the earlier
judgment invalidating the patent precluded Hartley from seeking any royalties for the patent. 7 6 Hartley maintained that when a court enters a
judgment pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, the judgment will give
rise only to claim preclusion, not issue preclusion. 7 7 The Federal Circuit
found that the earlier judgment precluded Hartley from relitigating the issue
78
of the validity of the patent, not only against 3M but also against Mentor.
Therefore, Hartley's settlement agreement and stipulated dismissal did not
vitiate the preclusive effect of the prior judgment. 79 The Federal Circuit
stated that for Hartley to ensure that the earlier judgment would have no
preclusive effects, Hartley needed to have the court vacate its earlier order." 8
Similarly, the plaintiff in Izumi'8 ' is seeking to eliminate the preclusive
effects of a trial judgment. 8 2 As noted earlier, Philips filed similar federal

National Union wanted lower court judgments vacated to avoid future collateral estoppel
effects).
170. 869 F.2d 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
171. Hartley v. Mentor Corp., 869 F.2d 1469, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1471-72.
178. Id. at 1473.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 971 F.2d 728 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. granted
sub nom. Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 113 S. Ct. 1249
(1993); see supra notes 62-84 and accompanying text (discussing Izumi case).
182. The plaintiff in Nestle also wished to avoid the potential preclusive effects of
judgments. See Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 281-84 (2d Cir. 1985)
(documenting Nestle's motivations for entering into postjudgment settlement that called for
vacatur of trial judgment). In Nestle the Second Circuit stated that Nestle desired to continue
to defend the Toll House trademark and feared that the existence of the earlier trial judgment
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suits against Windmere and Izumi in Florida district court and against Sears
and Izumi in Illinois district court pursuant to patent infringement and
unfair competition claims. 3 The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois ruled that a judgment for Windmere on the
unfair competition count of the Florida suit precluded Philips from contesting the same issue in Illinois district court.' 84 Rejecting Izumi's argument
that the preclusive use of the Florida judgment made vacatur of the district
court judgment inappropriate, the Federal Circuit granted Philips' and
Windmere's joint motion to vacate the district court judgment after the
parties had entered into a postjudgment settlement. 8 5 Subsequently, Philips
moved the Illinois district court to reinstate the unfair competition claim
against Sears. 8 6 The district court granted the motion expressly because the
Federal Circuit had vacated the judgment in the Florida suit that was the
basis for the Illinois district court's earlier finding of issue preclusion. 87
Therefore, Izumi presents the United States Supreme Court with the limited
issue of whether federal appellate courts should vacate district court judgments at parties' request pursuant to a postjudgment settlement when the
judgment has preclusive value for third parties. 88s Thus, the Supreme Court
most likely will not address the problem of parties' attempting to manipulate
precedent through vacatur of trial judgments.
The parties in National Union's also wished to avoid the preclusive
effects of a district court judgment. In National Union Seafirst and National
Union settled their dispute after the court had entered judgment on a jury
verdict that Seafirst had not obtained liability insurance through fraud.1c9
The parties' agreement explicitly stated that National Union still could
pursue Seafirst's insurance broker, attorney, and accountant for damages

in the suit involving Saccone would operate as issue preclusion in future litigation. Id. at 281.
Moreover, the Second Circuit explicitly admonished the district court for "[d]rumbeating about
the need to protect other unknown users of the trademark Toll House" because a denial of
the vacatur motion would cause the parties to expend significant amounts of money appealing
the original judgment and might even produce a reversal. Id. at 284.
183. See U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., No. 84-2508CIV, 1991 WL 338258, at
*1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 3, 1991) (stating that in October 1984 Philips brought patent infringement
and unfair competition claims against Windmere and Izumi); U.S. Philips Corp. v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., No. 85-C5366, 1987 WL 26123, at *1 (N.D. III. Dec. 2, 1987) (stating that
on June 6, 1985, Philips filed action against Sears and Izumi alleging that Sears infringed and
Izumi induced infringement of patents relating to Philips' "Norelco" rotary razor); supra
notes 62-84 and accompanying text (discussing Izumi case).
184. U.S. Philips v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. 85-C5366, 1992 WL 296361, at *1 (Oct.

14, 1992).
185. U.S. Philips, 971 F.2d at 731.
186. U.S. Philips, 1992 WL 296361, at *1.
187. Id. at *4.
188. See supra notes 181-87 and accompanying text (discussing Philips' motive in seeking
to have judgment of Florida district court vacated).
189. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Seafirst Corp., 891 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1989); see
supra notes 45-61 and accompanying text (discussing National Union decision).
190. National Union, 891 F.2d at 764.
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for their involvement in the procurement of the insurance policy at issue.' 9'
National Union apparently wished to avoid the preclusive effect of the
judgment in later litigation against these parties. However, the Ninth Circuit,
in contrast to the Federal Circuit in Izumi, pointed to the possible preclusive
effect of the judgment in litigation with third parties as providing a legitimate
reason for the district court to deny the parties' request for vacatur of the
judgment. 192

C. Ameliorating the Effects of Negative Publicity
Another possible motivation of parties seeking vacatur or reversal of a
judgment as a condition to settlement is the desire to reduce negative

publicity created by litigation.' 93 Trials may have significant nonmonetary
costs, and one of the most significant of these costs is negative publicity.'9
Adverse publicity from a trial can be especially harmful to an institutional
defendant.

95

A desire to alleviate the effects of negative publicity may have motivated
the defendants in Neary to make reversal of the trial court judgment a
condition of settlement. 96 Since the Supreme Court of California rendered
its decision, the defendants' counsel has stated that the three veterinarians
felt the jury's verdict, finding the veterinarians to have libeled Neary, had
damaged their reputation in the scientific community. 197 Furthermore, the

191. Id.

192. Id. at 769.
193. See infra notes 194-98 and accompanying text (asserting that desire to relieve negative
publicity is another major motivation for parties to seek vacatur of judgments).
194. Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d, 119, 122 (Cal. 1992).
195. Id.
196. See infra notes 197-98 and accompanying text (discussing possible motives of Neary
defendants for moving to have trial court judgment vacated). The amelioration of adverse
publicity also may have been the motivation behind the United States government's inclusion
of vacatur as a condition to settlement in Memorial Hospital. See supra notes 33-44 and
accompanying text (discussing facts and reasoning of MemorialHospital). 'In Memorial Hospital
a bankruptcy court held the federal government, litigating on behalf of a fiscal intermediary,
in contempt of court for violating the automatic stay under bankruptcy law. In re Memorial
Hosp., Inc., 862 F.2d 1299, 1301 (7th Cir. 1989). The Seventh Circuit suggested that the
government attempted to "escape notice" of this contempt judgment by having the bankruptcy
and district court opinions vacated. Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1302; see Klingeman, supra
note 1, at 243 (noting that Seventh Circuit suspected government was seeking vacatur because
baikruptcy court had found government's intermediary to be in contempt of court). Furthermore, the effects of issue preclusion could not have been the concern of the federal government
because a party cannot assert offensive nonmutual issue preclusion against the United States
government. Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1303 (citing United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S.
154 (1984)). However, the possibility exists that the government was attempting to prevent the
courts from establishing adverse precedent. The government had asserted on appeal to the
district court that the bankruptcy court's finding that a court must grant relief from the
automatic stay before the government can recover Medicare overpayments from a bankrupt
institution would undermine the entire statutory scheme covering Medicare provider reimbursement. In re Memorial Hosp., Inc., 82 B.R. 478, 480 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1988).
197. Cox, supra note 97, at 11.
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court of appeals indicated that the veterinarians' unwillingness to accept
dismissal of the appeal arose from their belief that the trial judgment had
harmed their professional standing so severely that they had difficulty
functioning in the scientific community.1 9
V.

ARGUMENTS FOR ALLOWING VACATUR OR REVERSAL AT WILL

Four major arguments support allowing vacatur or reversal at the will
of litigants to facilitate postjudgment settlement. Three arise from courts'
viewing the judicial process in terms of the traditional model of litigation,'9
and the fourth involves the doctrine of mootness. Under the traditional
model of litigation, a lawsuit is solely a vehicle for settling disputes of

private parties concerning private rights. 200 Furthermore, litigation is a
retrospective and self-contained undertaking. 20' In other words, proponents
of this viewpoint believe that the facts of a lawsuit always concern a
completed set of events and that the impact of a judgment is confined to
the litigants,2

except at the appellate level. 203 Under this view, only appellate

24
courts clarify the law by elaborating on generally applicable legal rules. 0

Trial judges play a passive role, simply applying appellate decisions to

resolve issues that the parties identify. 05
198. Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 278 Cal. Rptr. 773, 775 (Ct. App. 1991). The
defendants also had informed the court of appeals that they desired reversal because they did
not want the judgment to act as a continual reminder of the emotional trauma they had
suffered during the litigation. Id.
Additionally, the defendants did not appear to have any other implicit motive behind
their desire for reversal. The three veterinarians probably did not anticipate having to defend
another libel claim from a third party in the future. Therefore, they had little motive to erase
the decision to avoid its utilization as precedent in substantive libel law. Moreover, the Supreme
Court of California concluded that the case carried no potential collateral estoppel effects.
Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119, 125 (Cal. 1992). Both Neary and the
defendants agreed that the trial judgment did not affect any third party, and the supreme
court found nothing in the record to indicate otherwise. Id.
199. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HAgv. L.
REv. 1281, 1282-88 (1976) (presenting characteristics of traditional model of litigation).
200. Id. at 1282; see Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 283 (2d Cir. 1985)
(stating that parties should remain free to settle on terms that require vacatur of judgment,
entry of new consent judgment, or any other action as fits their needs); Neary, 834 P.2d at
124 (stating real value of judicial pronouncement is settling disputes that affect behavior of
defendant toward plaintiff); Rappaport, supra note 1, at 753 (stating that courts' role is to
resolve conflicts between "real" parties).
201. Chayes, supra note 199, at 1282-83. Chayes defines five factors in all that comprise
the private model of litigation. Id. Besides the fact that litigation is retrospective and selfcontained, the other three factors Chayes notes are that lawsuits are bipolar, that rights and
remedies are interdependent, and that the litigation process is party-initiated and partycontrolled. Id.
202. Id.
203. See id. at 1285 (stating that under traditional model of litigation, only at appellate
level does judicial process reach beyond import of parties immediately before court).
204. Id.
205. See id. at 1286 (asserting that under traditional model of litigation, only role of trial
judge is to decide issues litigants identified in accordance with rules appellate courts established).
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The first argument for allowing vacatur or reversal of judgments at the
will of the litigants to facilitate postjudgment settlement is judicial efficiency.

Because of the large caseloads most courts face2m and because private
settlements conserve judicial resources, the judiciary always should encourage settlement both at the trial and appellate level. 207 The denial of a motion
for vacatur or reversal when the granting of the motion is a condition
to
20
settlement expends judicial resources instead of conserving them. 1
However, this analysis fails to consider that the potential preclusive
effects of a trial judgment provide a large incentive for litigants to settle

before trial. 209 This incentive is removed if litigants know that they can
avoid these effects after a trial by conditioning a settlement upon the vacatur
or reversal of the judgment. 210 Therefore, routinely granting motions for
vacatur or reversal in many instances promotes expenditure of judicial
resources, rather than conserving these resources. 21' Allowing vacatur or
reversal at the will of the litigants also can result in a party repeatedly

litigating the same claim against different parties.2 12 Both of these factors
indicate that routinely granting motions for vacatur or reversal can thwart
the goal of conserving judicial resources.
The second argument is that trial judgments have no effect as precedent

unless an appellate court affirms the lower court decision. 2 3 Nevertheless,
lower court judgments do have precedential value, as evidenced by the large

206. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Background Paper, American Law Institute, Study on
Paths to a "Better Way". Litigation, Alternatives, and Accommodation, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824,
830 (discussing complaints about cost, high volume, and delay in modern civil justice system).
207. See Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119, 121 (Cal. 1992) (stating that
Supreme Court of California highly favors settlement and that benefits of settlement do not
disappear after court enters judgment); Klingeman, supra note 1, at 236 (stating that court's
refusal to vacate judgment may force parties to continue appeal and to increase litigation costs
to themselves, courts, and public); Rappaport, supra note 1, at 752 (stating that allowing
parties to settle after judgment avoids costs of adjudication of needless appeals).
208. See Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 282 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating
that denial of motion for vacatur, when granting of such motion is condition to settlement,
leads to more rather than less litigation).
209. See Fisch, supra note 1, at 637 (stating that Nestle analysis, fails to realize that
routinely allowing vacatur operates to encourage speculative litigation because parties can avoid
potential collateral costs of litigation).
210. See id. at 636-37 (stating that if litigant can reasonably anticipate that court will
grant postjudgment motion for vacatur, party may choose to wait until after trial to settle
because this decision will not be costly).
211. See id. at 637 (stating that vacatur operates to encourage speculative litigation rather
than to encourage pretrial settlement because vacatur allows parties to avoid potentially
unfavorable results of litigation).
212. Cf. Nestle, 756 F.2d at 281 (stating that Nestle moved for vacatur of trial judgment
because it desired to continue to defend Toll House trademark and feared judgment would
operate preclusively in subsequent litigation).
213. See Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119, 124 (Cal. 1992) (stating that
court of appeals incorrectly suggested that trial court judgments provide guidance to other
courts and litigants); Klingeman, supra note 1, at 246 (stating that settlement while claim is
pending appeal precludes creation of precedent in form of appellate judgment).
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number of federal district court opinions published every year. 214 A lower
25
court judgment is the first step in the process of developing precedent.
The vacatur of a trial court judgment may inhibit the development of
precedent in the area of substantive law that the court addresses in its
216
opinion.
The third argument for granting motions for vacatur and reversal at
the will of the litigants is that granting these motions facilitates fair treatment
of the litigants. This argument contends that the litigants are the people
most affected by the judgment. 217 By denying the litigants' motion for
vacatur or reversal, the court requires the parties to continue to bear the
many burdens of litigation when they really wish to bring their dispute to

an end. 2 s These hardships include both the financial and psychological costs
of litigation. 21 9 Parties often choose settlement for pragmatic reasonssettlement is the most reasonable and inexpensive solution to their dispute
under the circumstances. 22 Moreover, the losing party often may wish to
alleviate bad publicity from the trial through vacatur. 221 The argument of
fairness to the litigants has validity, but it cannot necessitate granting
motions for vacatur or reversal in every case because it ignores the significant
public implications that court judgments may have.'
The fourth argument favoring granting motions for vacatur and reversal
of judgments pursuant to postjudgment settlement is that once the parties
settle their dispute the case is moot. Litigants have argued that this mootness

requires the court to vacate the trial judgment automatically according to

214. See Fisch, supra note 1, at 629 n.205 (stating that scholars contending that utility
of published opinions is limited to decisions of appellate courts might reconsider if scholars
were aware of large number of trial court opinions that are published annually).
215. See infra notes 253-57 and accompanying text (discussing importance of persuasive
precedent in development of legal rules).
216. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text (explaining how vacatur of judgment
may deter later litigants from utilizing vacated decision).
217. Neary, 834 P.2d at 123.
218. See id. (listing costs that parties incur through litigation process and asserting that
because of these costs, simple fairness calls for courts to accommodate parties' wishes);
Rappaport, supra note I, at 751-52 (stating that court's denying parties ability to negate
collateral estoppel effects of judgment through settlement causes winning party to remain
unpaid and forces losing party to expend resources on appeal); Zeller, supra note 1, at 867
(expressing that settlement resolves uncertainties, restores amicable relations, and frees parties
to concentrate on more productive activities).
219. See Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119, 123 (Cal. 1992) (asserting that
compelling litigants to continue their appeal will subject them not only to further legal costs,
but also continuing psychological burdens).
220. Kipp D. Snider, Note, The Vacatur Remedy for Cases Becoming Moot Upon Appeal:
In Search of a Workable Solution for the FederalCourts, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1642, 1673
(1992).
221. See supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text (discussing alleviation of adverse
publicity as motivation for seeking vacatur or reversal).
222. See discussion infra part VI (arguing that judgments can have significant impact on
general public and can provide significant public benefits).
-I.
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United States v. Munsingwear, Inc. 223 Munsingwear involved a government
claim against a business for violating regulations that set maximum prices
for the sale of specific commodities. 224 The government lost at trial, and
while the case was pending appeal, the price of the commodity involved
was decontrolled. 22 The Supreme Court stated that a court should reverse
26
or vacate a civil case that becomes moot while an appeal is pending.2
Nevertheless, when parties have conditioned settlement upon vacatur of
a lower court judgment, the federal courts consistently have held that the
controversy is not moot. 227 The reasoning behind this view is that the parties'

dispute is still alive if the court denies the litigants' motion.8 However,
some disagreement exists as to whether a court should vacate a judgment
due to mootness when the parties settle their dispute first and later move
the court to vacate or reverse the trial judgment. 2 9 The majority of courts,

though, finding Munsingwear inapplicable when litigants moot a case through
deliberate action, have held that the settlement of a dispute while an appeal
230
is pending does not automatically entitle litigants to vacatur.

223. 340 U.S. 36 (1950).
224. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 37 (1950).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 39; see also Great Western Sugar Co. v. Nelson, 442 U.S. 92, 94 (1979)

(stating that when appeal becomes moot due to completion of arbitration proceedings, correct
procedure is to vacate both court of appeals and district court judgments). The Court in
Munsingwearcited Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood Co., 299 U.S. 259 (1936), for the doctrine
that the appellate court has the "duty" to reverse or vacate the judgment below when a case
becomes moot pending a Supreme Court decision. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 39 (citing Duke
Power, 299 U.S. at 267). In Duke Power, the district court had entered a decree permanently
enjoining defendants from carrying out a contract. Duke Power, 299 U.S. at 261. The defendant
later terminated the original contract and entered into a new contract, which eliminated the
terms of the earlier contract that the district court had found objectionable, mooting the
controversy. Id. at 262, 267.
227. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Seafirst Corp., 891 F.2d 762, 766-67 (9th Cir.
1989) (stating that Munsingwear doctrine is inapplicable when mootness 'arises from deliberate
actions of litigant); In re Memorial Hosp., Inc., 862 F.2d 1299, 1301 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding
that Munsingwear does not apply when parties settle case conditionally upon vacatur of lower
court judgment); Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 282 (2d Cir. 1985) (same).
228. See Nestle, 756 F.2d at 282 (stating that when parties make settlement conditional
upon vacatur of district court judgment, vacatur does not result from' case's mootness, but
rather, mootness is consequence of vacatur).
229. See Snider, supra note 220, at 1673 (providing in-depth discussion of when courts
should vacate judgments in cases which become moot pending appeal). 1
230. See Karcher .v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 83 (1987) (stating that Munsingwearis inapplicable
when appeal becomes moot because losing party declines to pursue appeal and not because of
circumstances unattributable to parties); Riverhead Say. Bank v. Nat'l Mortgage Equity Corp.,
893 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that Munsingwear does not apply when appellants
moot action through their own actions); Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 585 (7th
Cir. 1986) (stating that case does not become moot pursuant to Munsingwear when parties
voluntarily abandon their rights to further review); Center for Science in Pub. Interest v.
Regan, 727 F.2d 1161, 1165-66 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that when partyl before court prevents
review of district court judgment through deliberate action, court of appeals should not order
district court to vacate its judgment); Ringsby Truck Lines v. Western Conference of Teamsters,
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THE PuLBUc VALUE OF COURT JUDGMENTS

Courts that favor granting motions for vacatur or reversal to facilitate
settlement under almost any circumstances fail to consider that judicial
decisions serve important functions beyond the resolution of the litigants'
immediate dispute.
A.

The Public Effect of Judgments

First, these courts fail to recognize that judicial decisions often affect
large groups of people not directly before the court. 2 ' In the past forty
years, society has become increasingly bureaucratized, and now many transactions do not occur solely on a bilateral basis. 232 Congress has developed
numerous social programs that affect the interests of significant numbers
of people. 231 Congress also has created large agencies to run these programs.3 4 Because of the broad discretion these bureaucratic agencies have
in implementing statutory programs, 23s much litigation now concerns public
challenges to the propriety of administrative action. 236 Judicial decisions
construing tax, welfare, and housing legislation provide examples of such
7
disputes.

686 F.2d 720, 722 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that exception to Munsingwear applies when
appellant caused dismissal of appeal by his dwn act); see also Clipper v. Takoma Park, 898
F.2d 18, 19 (4th Cir. 1989) (denying request that appellate court withdraw its opinion when
parties settled dispute while court of appeals considered parties petition for rehearing); Armster
v. United States Dist. Court, 806 F.2d 1347, 1354-56 (9th Cir. 1986) (refusing to vacate
appellate judgment when case became moot after court of appeals rendered decision and
reasoning that allowing vacatur under such circumstances would encourage manipulation of
judicial process). But see Stewart v. Southern Ry., 315 U.S. 784 (1942) (vacating Supreme
Court's judgement along with judgment of court of appeals when parties settled case while
Court considered petition for rehearing); Clipper, 898 F.2d at 19-20 (Widener, J., dissenting)
(arguing that court of appeals should have withdrawn opinion due to mootness when case
settled while appellate court was considering petition for rehearing); Ruiz v. Estelle, 688 F.2d
266, 266-67 (5th Cir. 1982) (vacating portion of appellate opinion pertaining-to issue settled
by litigants before court of appeals issued decision), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983).
231. See Chayes, supra note 199, at 1281 (discussing public litigation model of judicial
process).
232. See id. at 1291 (noting growing awareness that many important public and private
interactions take place on bureaucratized basis).
233. See Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96
HARv. L. Rav. 1, 9 (stating that recent congressional legislation affects broad array of diffuse
interests).
234. Cf. id. at 60 (stating that central phenomena of modern administrative state is that
bureaucratic agencies run institutions and programs that affect large numbers of people).
235. See id. (stating that bureaucratic decisionmakers exercise broadly delegated powers
in running congressional programs).
236. See id. (recognizing that now parties extensively use judiciary to control actions of
federal administrative agencies).
237. See Chayes, supra note 199, at 1294 (stating that suits involving statutory construction
of tax, welfare, and housing legislation have impact on large numbers of people not before
courts).
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Suits that involve individuals' attempts to enforce statutory rights also
provide examples of judicial determinations that can have a significant
public effect. In the recent past, Congress has extended statutory protection
to many rights that courts previously did not recognize, such as a person's
right to nondiscriminatory treatment. 28 In resolving disputes involving such
statutory rights, the courts consider broad questions of policy in addition
to weighing the interests of the litigants. 29 For example, public policy issues
are very important in lawsuits brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employers from discriminating against
employees on the basis of race.? In such litigation, a court must determine
both how to redress the plaintiff's injuries and how to further Congress's
goal of assuring equality of employment opportunities.241 Therefore, the
litigants are not the only people with an interest in the litigation, because
the public also benefits generally from judgments that decrease discrimination in society. 24 2 The Supreme Court of the United States and the federal
courts of appeals have recognized the important public ramifications of
such statutory claims, as evidenced by holdings that the federal courts retain
the ultimate authority to decide lawsuits brought pursuant to specific federal
3
statutes.2

238. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1975a-1975d, 2000a to 2000h-6 (1988 & Supp.
11 1990); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988 & Supp.
11 1990); see Chayes, supra note 233, at 23 (stating that standing explosion of 1960s resulted
from recognition of legal protection of new categories of interests, such as conservation,
personal expression, and privacy).
239. See Chayes, supra note 199, at 1294-95 (stating that suits involving enforcement of
statutory rights often consist of arguments over how courts should implement government
policy). As suits involving the vindication of statutory policies become more common, the job
of the courts begins to resemble legislation rather than just the resolution of private disputes.
Id. at 1297. A problem draws the court's attention, and the court attempts to develop measures
to cure the mischief for the future as well as the present. Id.
240. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1975a-1975d, 2000a to 2000h-6 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)).
241. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44-45 (1974) (stating that private
litigants not only redress their own injury, but also vindicate congressional policy against
discriminatory employment practices by bringing suits pursuant to Title VII of Civil Rights
Act of 1964).
242. See Chayes, supra note 199, at 1295-96 (stating that when party brings lawsuit
pursuant to congressional enactment, courts acknowledge that statute embodies affirmative
objective that courts should foster, and in shaping relief, courts give due weight to interests
of unrepresented parties).
243. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292 (1984) (holding that when
plaintiff brings action pursuant to Civil Rights Act of 1871, federal court should not afford
res judicata or collateral estoppel effect to award given in arbitration proceeding); Alexander,
415 U.S. at 59-60 (holding that federal court should consider de novo plaintiff's action brought
pursuant to Civil Rights Act of 1964 when plaintiff earlier had submitted claim to final
arbitration under nondiscrimination clause of collective bargaining agreement); American Safety
Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827-28 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that claims
brought pursuant to Sherman Anti-Trust Act are inappropriate for arbitration); see alsb Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1657 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating
that Court should not compel plaintiffs to submit claims pursuant to Age in Discrimination
Act of 1967 to binding arbitration).
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Similarly, tort litigation may have implications for parties not directly
before the court. As mass products liability claims have become more
common, courts and commentators have developed new theories of tort

liability that, instead of simply aiming to compensate victims for their
injuries, attempt to alter producer behavior by shifting the costs of accidents
to the producers of goods.2 4 As a result, courts sometimes issue judgments
assessing punitive damages against product liability defendants-action spe-

cifically designed to alter conduct2S-and are more willing to provide
plaintiffs with injunctive relief.Y Therefore, some judgments against companies that produce faulty products have ramifications for persons beyond
the litigants.? 7 Such judgments provide a message to similarly situated
companies that, in theory, should cause them to produce safer products
and save others from suffering similar injuries.

Today, many lawsuits involve claims challenging administrative action,
attempting to enforce statutory rights, or seeking to hold companies liable

for dangerous products. Accordingly, when considering whether to grant a
motion to vacate or reverse a lower court judgment in order to facilitate
postjudgment settlement, a court should not assume that only the litigants
have an interest in the judgment. Courts should recognize that the judgment
may have implications for parties not directly before the court.
B. The Development of Precedent
Viewing litigation simply as a means of resolving disputes between the
litigants also ignores the other primary function of courts: producing legal
rules that guide other courts in resolving future disputes. 24 In deciding
cases, courts determine what the parties' exact legal obligations are under
the specific circumstances of their dispute.2 9 Courts create narrow legal
rules that other courts can apply in similar situations. 2 0 However, no two
244. See Richard L. Marcus, PublicLaw Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 647, 671 (1988) (stating that path-breaking scholars and courts have propelled
plaintiffs into new theories of liability to improve plaintiffs' chances of attaining compensation
and to alter behavior of providers of goods and services).
245. See id. at 671-72 (stating that courts' increased willingness to assess punitive damages
is explicit endorsement of relief designed to alter conduct); cf. BLACK's LAW DICnONARY 390
(6th ed. 1990) (defining punitive damages as damages that are above amount needed to
compensate plaintiffs and that are intended to make examples of defendants).
246. See Marcus, supra note 244, at 672-73 (providing examples of courts that have found
injunctive relief to be proper remedy in some tort cases).
247. See id. at 672 (stating that tort litigation often has substantial social importance in
addition to "private" significance).
248. See infra notes 249-57 and accompanying text (discussing importance of courts' role
of developing guiding precedent).
249. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & EcoN. 249, 249 (1976) (stating that in resolving dispute over
meaning of statute, court defines specific requirements of statute in circumstances presented
in case).
250. See id. at 249-50 (stating that court's resolution of legal dispute creates specific rule
applicable to like circumstances, but rule court creates in single decision tends to be narrow
because rule is limited to court's holding).
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controversies are factually identical. In each case, courts must decide whether
to apply, extend, or reformulate relevant legal doctrines. 2 1 Nevertheless,
the accumulation of numerous judicial decisions can create general doctrines
of law that courts may apply broadly in future cases and that in many
ways have the same effect as explicit statutory rules. 252
In addition, a court's judgment has significance beyond any binding
precedent it may create. A court's opinion makes a contribution to legal
thought in the substantive area that the case addresses. Courts often rely

on persuasive precedent in their legal reasoning. 253 When deciding whether
to extend a rule to a new set of circumstances, a court often will consider
if courts in other jurisdictions have applied legal doctrine in a similar

manner . 54 Furthermore, well-reasoned persuasive precedent may convince a
court to create exceptions to binding precedent. 255 Because this discourse

between courts is an important factor in the development of law,2 6 even
lower court judgments, though having little formal effect, may play a
257
significant role in the process of developing precedent.

C.

The Economic Value of Precedent

Most courts that favor granting vacatur or reversal of judgments to
facilitate settlements point to advantages of postjudgment settlement that

relate to increasing efficiency, such as cost savings to the individual partiesbenefits that are easily quantifiable.

8

However, judgments also can promote

251. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, Ti

NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 36 (1988).
252. See RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 509 (3d ed. 1986) (stating

that accumulation of precedents dealing with same question will often create rule of law
virtually having force of explicit statutory rule); Landes & Posner, supra note 249, at 250
(stating that solidifying rule in long line of decisions enhances authority of legal rule).
253. See EISENBERG, supra note 251, at 97 (discussing studies finding that state supreme
courts frequently cite to out-of-state cases and other secondary sources).
254. See id. at 98 (stating that court will employ legal rule established in professional
literature when there is no local precedent that governs issue in question).
255. See id. (stating that courts will treat doctrines established in professional literature
as law even if they lead to different results than local precedent suggests, as long as local
precedent is not flatly contradictory).
256. See id. at 156 (stating that criticism and understanding of legal propositions expressed
in professional discourse and doctrinal propositions established in professional literature instruct
courts in determining law).
257. See Fisch, supra note 1, at 629 n.205 (stating that large number of district court
decisions that are published in reporters displays significant role that federal district court
decisions play in development of precedent).
258. See supra notes 206-08 and accompanying text (presenting argument that courts
should routinely grant motions for vacatur or reversal made pursuant to postjudgment
settlement to conserve judicial resources and save litigants from costs of, appeal). One cannot
as readily quantify the economic benefits that ariie from a court's judgment. See generally
Robert D. Cooter, The Best Right Laws: Value Foundations of the Economic Analysis of
Law, 64 NOTRE DAmE L. REV. 817 (1989) (asserting that economic theory of Pareto efficiency
is of little use in examining net benefit society derives from particular judgments or legal
concepts); Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law and Economics, 78 CAL. L. Rv. 815 (1990)
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efficiency. Assuming that lawsuits occur when parties are unable to agree
on the likely outcome of litigation, more litigation will exist in uncertain
areas of the law. 25 9 Therefore, the proliferation of judgments clarifying legal
rules can decrease the amount of litigation that parties undertake, because
these judgments generally add more certainty to the law. 26° If the law is
more certain, attorneys are better able to assess the probable outcome of
litigation, and potential litigants are more likely to settle their dispute
without judicial intervention. 261 Furthermore, attorneys can better advise
clients on how to avoid legal conflicts when planning transactions if the
legal obligations of parties in certain situations are clear. 2 2 If the number
of legal conflicts that occur in transactions is decreased, the total cost of
engaging in transactions will be less.
(discussing failure of positive economic theory to realistically quantify social value of judicial
decisions). Many legal economists attempt to measure the benefits of laws according to their
effect upon wealth maximization or on people's welfare. See id. at 825-835 (analyzing legal
economists' attempts to use theory of wealth maximization to empirically measure welfare
effects of laws). The theory of wealth maximization allows the legal economist to measure the
consequences of a legally significant event in three ways: (1) how much the victim would be
willing to pay to avoid the consequences of the event, (2) how much the offender would have
to be paid to abandon the activity, and (3) the market value of the damage to the victim. Id.
at 825. But the wealth that a person possesses does not always directly reflect that individual's
welfare. See id. at 828 (stating that people often make choices that lower their incomes but
provide larger amount of nonmonetary satisfaction). Often a legal judgment decreases one
person's welfare while increasing another person's welfare. See id. at 835 (stating that to
determine if criminal law results in net increase in welfare one would have to compare loss of
criminal to gain of potential victims). Particularly when a legal principle involves involuntary

transactions such as divorce, theft, rape, pollution, libel, or fraud, economic analysis has
difficulty explaining the law's welfare effects. Id. at 841. Moreover, utility is a concept that
is difficult to measure empirically because it involves a person's subjective determination that
the person is "well off." Id. at 831. An outside observer cannot easily measure a person's
desires or preferences, especially in a manner that allows the observer to compare that
individual's preferences with someone else's preferences. Id. at 836.
Similarly, the economic theory of Pareto efficiency considers a law to be efficient if it
increases the welfare of at least one person without decreasing the welfare of anyone else.
Cooter, supra, at 821-22. However, actual changes in law are almost never Pareto improvements. Id. at 831.
259. Landes & Posner, supra note 249, at 270; see Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and
Contract in Consent Judgments, 1987 U. Cm. LEOAL F. 19, 26 (stating that uncertainty is
likely to be greater in areas of law in which few rulings exist).
260. See PosNER, supra note 252, at 511 (stating that generation of precedent reduces
legal uncertainty, which causes amount of litigation to fall); Landes & Posner, supra note 249,
at 272 (stating that as stock of legal knowledge relating to statute builds, uncertainty falls and
consequently amount of litigation concerning statute also decreases).
261. See Philip B. Heyman, Considering the Costs and Benefits of Lawyering in Drafting
Legislation or EstablishingPrecedents, 36 ViIL. L. REv. 191, 201 (1991) (stating that litigation
arises when parties cannot agree on meaning of law as applied to specific factual situation
and that, conversely, if parties to suit have similar views as to value of potential judgment
they will probably settle before trial).
262. See id. at 210 (stating that in planning transactions clear legal rules can facilitate
agreements between parties that adjust parties' expectations of each other under circumstances
presented); EIsENao, supra note 251, at 4 (stating that society has enormous need for legal
rules that allow private individuals to plan activity).
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Even a single trial judgment can promote efficiency if it has collateral
estoppel effect. If a court decides that another court determined an issue
in prior litigation, the court can preclude a party from subsequently arguing
about the same issue. 263 By applying issue preclusion, the court resolves the
legal issue quickly and avoids expense to the litigants and the courts.
Judgments also can promote efficiency by deterring immoral behavior.

Adherence to some moral principles, such as honesty and trustworthiness,
increases efficiency because acting in accordance with these principles reduces

transaction costs. 264 The common law in many instances provides incentives

for people to observe such moral principles. 26 51 For example, contract law

promotes honest and trustworthy behavior by allowing parties to rescind
contracts induced through fraud. 26 Similarly, contract law often requires
parties to fulfill their promises, or subjects parties to liability for damages
for breach of their promises. 267 Court judgments punishing parties who act
immorally provide public statements that people will incur penalties for such
behavior, 26 and can deter people from acting in ways that increase trans269
action costs.
VII.

TiM PROPER STANDARD TO APPLY TO MOTIONS Po

VACATUR UPON

SETTLEMENT

A standard that allows courts to grant motions for vacatur or reversal
of lower court judgments as a matter of right to facilitate postjudgment
settlement, 270 absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances,vI does not

263. See supra notes 157-65 and accompanying text (discussing doctrine of collateral
estoppel).
264. POSNER, supra note 252, at 238-39.
265. See infra notes 266-69 and accompanying text (describing how judgments promote
efficiency by deterring immoral behavior). Moral principles are the basis for much of the
common law. See POSNER, supra note 252, at 238 (stating that correction of injustice and
vindication of moral sense were fundamental principles of common law of England and United
States).
266. See 1 SAMUEL WMLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CONTRACTS § 1:20, at 49-50
(Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 1990) (stating that promises induced by fraud form voidable
contracts).
267. See id. § 1:1, at 2-5 (defining term "contract").
268. Cf. POsNER, supra note 252, at 242-43 (emphasizing need for law to be public to
have deterrent effect).
269. See id. (stating that viewing law from economic perspective, law can be useful as
system for altering incentives and regulating behavior).
270. See Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 283 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating
that Second Circuit routinely will grant motions for vacatur pursuant to postjudgment settlement
agreements); see also U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 971 F.2d 728, 731 (Fed. Cir.
1992), cert. granted sub nom. Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp.,
113 S. Ct. 1249 (1993) (granting joint motion for vacatur of district court judgment pursuant
to postjudgment settlement despite judgment's use for preclusive purposes in another suit).
271. See Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119, 120 (Cal. 1992) (holding that
when reversal is condition of settlement agreement, appellate courts should grant joint motions
for reversal of trial court judgments under all but extreme circumstances).
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give sufficient consideration to the value the public derives from judgments.
This standard ignores the public effect of many judgments, allows litigants
to disrupt the judicial system's development of precedent, and prevents
judgments from promoting efficiency.27 Applying such a deferential standard
to motions for vacatur gives more weight to private litigants' wishes concerning
the establishment of legal rules than to the views of judges. Giving litigants'
views such influence is a problem when litigation has significant public effects
and has important public policy ramifications, such as when a party is
challenging the propriety of an administrative agency's actions or attempting
to enforce a statutory right that furthers a congressional goal. 2 3 This standard
allows the interests of private parties with significant financial resources to
outweigh society's interest in justice and fairness. 274 Consequently, wealthy
private parties can usurp control over the legal process, promoting the
perception that the judicial system is illegitimate. 275
Additionally, lower court decisions constitute the beginning of the process
of creating precedent.? 6 If courts allow litigants to vacate or reverse trial
tm
judgments virtually at will, this could stifle the development of precedent.
Consequently, courts would allow uncertainty to remain in specific substantive
areas of the law, which would decrease efficiency. 278
Conversely, a standard by which courts always deny motions for vacatur
of trial court judgments made pursuant to settlement agreements is too
inflexible and dismisses too swiftly the benefits of private settlement z79
Although the benefits of settlement are not as great as the proponents of
granting vacatur or reversal at the will of litigants assert,M courts should not
272. See discussion supra part VI (arguing that judgments can have important public
impact and can provide significant public benefits).
273. See supra notes 231-47 and accompanying text (asserting that judgments can have
significant impact on public).
274. Cf. Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984)
(asserting that distribution of financial resources significantly affects bargaining process, and
therefore settlement is at odds with any concept of justice that seeks to make parties' wealth
irrelevant).
275. See Neary, 834 P.2d at 127-28 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (stating that court erodes
public respect for judicial system when court decides that party who has litigated and lost at
trial can, by paying sum of money sufficient to secure settlement conditioned upon reversal,
purchase nullification of adverse judgment); Fisch, supra note 1, at 631 (stating that judicial
system in which wealthy litigants can use litigation process as nonbinding gambling procedure
is abhorrent).
276. See supra notes 253-57 and accompanying text (discussing contribution that lower
court judgments make to development of precedent).
277. See supra notes 248-57 and accompanying text (discussing process courts engage in
to develop guiding precedent).
278. See supra notes 259-69 and accompanying text (discussing how judgments can promote
economic efficiency).
279. See In re Memorial Hosp., Inc., 862 F.2d 1299, 1300 (7th Cir. 1988) (announcing
that Seventh Circuit will always deny parties' motions for vacatur of district court opinions
or judgments).
280. See supra notes 209-12 and accompanying text (asserting that allowing vacatur or
reversal at will of litigant may increase use of judicial resources).
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discount absolutely the importance of clearing court dockets 2s l and the financial and psychological burdens that litigants incur through an appealYm
Moreover, the outcome of litigation does not always have significant ramifications for the public, and not every judicial decision makes a meaningful
contribution to legal thought.
Because neither an absolute standard that requires always granting motions for vacatur pursuant to settlement nor an absolute standard that
routinely denies such motions adequately takes into account all of the relevant
considerations, courts should apply a standard similar to that developed by
the Ninth Circuit in National Union.213The Ninth Circuit has concluded that
the equities in each situation should determine whether a court will grant a
motion for vacatur pursuant to a postjudgment settlement.'28 However, the
considerations should be broader than those the Ninth Circuit set forth,
which are limited to the public interest in finality of judgments and the
parties' rights to relitigation of unreviewed issues 3 s
When determining whether to grant a motion for vacatr pursuant to a
settlement agreement, a court should first contemplate the precedential value
of the trial court opinion. If the decision pertains to an unsettled area of
substantive law, a court should deny the motion because such decisions
contribute to the development of legal doctrines 2 6 and increase efficiency by
clarifying people's legal obligations. 2 7 Secondly, a court should examine
whether the judgment might have preclusive value to other' parties.ts If the
dispute implicates parties besides the litigants, a court should not grant the
motion. 29 Courts that vacate judgments impacting third parties who are not
before the court may destroy any opportunity these unrepresented parties
have to use the judgment for issue preclusion purposes in future litigation,
and may cause other courts to expend judicial resources junnecessarily by

281. See supra notes 206-08 and accompanying text (explaining argument that large court
caseloads have created need for conservation of judicial resources).
282. See supra notes 217-21 and accompanying text (discussing argument that fairness
compels courts to acquiesce to parties' wishes to facilitate settlement because parties incur
substantial financial and psychological costs in litigation).
283. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Seafirst Corp., 891 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1989).
284. Id. at 764; see supra notes 45-61 and accompanying text (discussing holding of
National Union).
285. Id.
286. See supra notes 248-57 and accompanying text (explaining that courts serve important
function by producing legal rules to guide courts in resolving future disputes).
287. See supra notes 259-63 and accompanying text (describing how: court judgment can
decrease amount of litigation by reducing amount of uncertainty in specific substantive areas
of law).
288. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Seafirst Corp., 891 F.2d 762, 765 (9th Cir. 1989)
(stating that district court should determine whether to grant motions for vacatur pursuant to
postjudgment settlement by weighing competing values of finality of judgment and litigants'
rights to relitigation of unreviewed issues).
289. See id. at 769 (stating that district court correctly denied motion for vacatur because
presence of third party interests created possibility that judgment could have preclusive effect
in later litigation).
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forcing these courts to resolve issues that have already been determined.29
Subsequent courts that can consider both sides' arguments concerning the
propriety of applying issue preclusion and the specific circumstances under
which a party is seeking such action should make the decision of whether to
preclude a party from arguing about an issue raised in earlier litigation. 29
Lastly, a court should try to determine the litigants' motives for seeking
vacatur. 292While examination of the first two factors will provide some insight
into this inquiry, it is important for the court to undertake a separate analysis
to determine the parties' motives. If a court's decision has little precedential
value and does not implicate third parties, a court should further examine
the circumstances surrounding the parties' motion for vacatur. If the parties
possess legitimate reasons for moving the court to take such action, such as
ameliorating bad publicity 93 or alleviating the psychological effects of litigation,29 the court should grant the parties' motion. However, allowing a party
to vacate trial court decisions when a party possesses a discernible motive to
either shape precedent or avoid the preclusive effects of a decision casts
considerable doubt on the legitimacy of the judicial system. 295 Granting a
motion for vacatur under such circumstances amounts to an endorsement of
manipulation of the legal process.
A court should consider these same factors when determining whether to
grant a motion for reversal of a lower court judgment pursuant to a
postjudgment settlement. However, a presumption should exist against granting a motion for reversal. This is essentially the approach California Supreme
Court Justice Kennard advocates in her dissent to the Neary majority opinion.29 The severe implications of reversing a judgment justify the application

290. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (stating that vacatur of judgment generally
deprives judgment of preclusive effect).
291. Cf. Bates v. Union Oil Co., 944 F.2d 647, 650 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that judgment
vacated pursuant to settlement agreement may still have preclusive effect in later litigation if
vacating court in making determination whether to grant litigants' motion for vacatur failed
to consider possibility that third parties could use judgment for collateral estoppel purposes);
Hartley v. Mentor Corp., 869 F.2d 1469, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (stating that when parties
dismiss their case pending appeal, district court in subsequent case in which party asserts
collateral estoppel should make determination of collateral estoppel effect of judgment).
292. See Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119, 127 (Cal. 1992) (Kennard, J.,
dissenting) (stating that when appellate court is contemplating settlement conditioned upon
reversal of trial judgment, court should examine parties' reasons for seeking reversal of
judgment).
293. See supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text (discussing amelioration of adverse
publicity as possible motive behind parties' making vacatur of lower court judgment condition
of settlement).
294. See supra note 219-20 and accompanying text (explaining that many litigants desire
to settle cases pending appeal simply to end psychological hardships of litigation).
295. See supra notes 274-75 and accompanying text (asserting that courts erode public
respect for judicial system when courts allow parties to purchase nullification of trial judgments
by routinely granting motions for vacatur pursuant to postjudgment settlement agreements).
296. Neary, 834 P.2d at 127 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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of a more stringent standard than that applied to motions for vacatur. 297
VIII.

CONCLUSION

With the Supreme Court granting certiorari to consider a case that presents
only one problem associated with vacating trial court judgments upon postjudgment settlements, 298 and with parties' increasing use Iof this device at
both the federal and state level, the courts will continue to grapple with the
issue of whether to grant or deny motions for vacatur when such action is a
condition to postjudgment settlement agreements. A court's determination of
whether or not to grant these motions has significant ramifications. Judgments
have value for the public, but litigants also have legitimate interests in ending
the hardships of litigation. The suggested standard allows courts to weigh all
of the relevant considerations in each case and, more importantly, should
produce just outcomes for both litigants and society.
MICHAEL W. LOUDENSLAGER

297. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (discussing ramifications of reversal of
lower court judgments).
298. See supra notes 181-88 and accompanying text (explaining that Izumi presents
Supreme Court with limited issue of whether federal courts should grant parties' motions for
vacatur of district court judgments when other courts have used trial judgment for issue
preclusion purposes).

